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TOPIC V.A.2 
PAUL MARCUS 
Alternative Penal Sanctions 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States has a dual court system, one at the national 
level and the other at the state level. Like the federal system of gov-
ernment, each judicial system is legally supreme within its ownjuris-
diction. However, there are also shared or overlapping 
responsibilities. For example, possession of narcotics can violate both 
federal and state law. The accused is therefore subject to prosecution 
in either a state or federal jurisdiction.1 Where an offender is 
charged will depend on where he committed his act, what act he com-
mitted, and who arrested him. 
State courts try the vast majority of criminal cases filed in the 
United States, hearing almost 100 million matters each year. In fact, 
the courts in a single, medium-sized state may handle more cases 
than the entire federal judiciary.2 Each state has its own independ-
ent penal code and method of sentencing. If the defendant has been 
convicted under a criminal statute promulgated by a state legisla-
ture, her sentence will most likely be determined by a state judge 
who will impose a sentence somewhere within a wide, statutorily 
fixed range. However, some states have promulgated sentencing 
guidelines which severely restrict judicial discretion. In a few states, 
the legislature has provided for jury sentencing. 
If the defendant has committed a crime which subjects her to the 
jurisdiction of the federal government, she will be tried in a federal 
court and the sentence will be imposed by a federal district judge who 
will use the sentencing guidelines to determine the defendant's sen-
tence. Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear all cases arising under 
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1. At times the defendant may be charged by both. Because they are independ-
ent sovereigns, the double jeopardy provision of the Eighth Amendment to the Consti-
tution is not violated. See, Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). 
2. David W. Neubauer, America's Courts and the Criminal Justice System 47 
(1992). "At least ninety-four percent of the nation's criminal cases are state cases and 
ninety-one percent of all prisoners are housed in state institutions." Reitz, "Sentenc-
ing Reform in the States," 64 U. of Colo. L. Rev. 645 (1993). 
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the Constitution and the laws of the United States.3 There are no 
common-law offenses against the United States, only those acts 
which are made criminal by an act of Congress may be prosecuted. 4 
This system of sovereignties in the United States - state and federal 
- is easy to define. The criticism of the system, particularly regard-
ing penal sanctions, is far more complex and troubling. Before con-
sidering recent, innovative alternatives in penal sanctions, an 
overview of this criticism is necessary. 
II. CRITICISM OF THE SYSTEM OF PENAL SANCTIONS 
Traditionally, federal and state judges were given wide discre-
tion to impose a sentence anywhere below a statutory maximum.5 
These sentences could be based on virtually any factor that the judge 
deemed important, no explanation was needed to be given for a 
judge's decision, and the decision was virtually non-appealable if 
within statutory limits. Before its guidelines went into effect, Con-
gress passed statutes that established sentencing limits for different 
offenses in the federal courts. However, these statutes almost always 
delegated broad discretion to the judge in setting an appropriate sen-
tence in a specific case.6 Under this system, a judge could consider 
each case individually and choose a sentence that she felt would best 
serve society and the offender. A sentence imposed on a convicted 
individual could depend on any factor "concerning the defendant's life 
and characteristics."7 
However, there are problems with this traditional system of sen-
tencing. Allowing judges to impose sentences based on their own 
political philosophies and concepts of justice lead to demonstrably 
disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants. A sentence im-
posed on a convicted individual might have depended more on the 
personality and background of the individual judge than the charac-
teristics of the individual defendant.8 Disparate sentences were, in 
large part, the result of differing judicial philosophies about the pur-
pose of sentencing. One judge might have imposed a long prison sen-
tence while another might have decided probation was a more 
3. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
4. United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677 (1892). 
5. Burns, "The Presentence Interview and the Right to Counsel: A Critical Stage 
Under the Federal Sentencing Structure," 34 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 527, 537 (1993). 
6. See S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Admin. News at 3182, 3222. 
7. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949). 
8. See generally, Lee, "The Sentencing Court's Discretion to Depart Downward 
in Recognition of a Defendant's Substantial Assistance: A Proposal to Eliminate the 
Government Motion Requirement," 23 Ind. L. Rev. 681 (1990), quoting Lowe, "Modern 
Sentencing Reform: A Preliminary Analysis of the Proposed Sentencing Guidelines," 
25 Amer. Grim. L. Rev. 1, 11 n. 54 (1987). 
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appropriate sentence for the same individual if that judge believed 
the primary goal of sentencing was rehabilitation.9 
An additional problem emerged as well. The sentence imposed 
on an offender rarely, if ever, reflected the actual time served. Com-
monly a defendant served only one-third of the sentence before the 
Parole Commission ordered release. Victims' groups echoed public 
sentiment that while sentences imposed on convicted individuals 
may have reflected the seriousness of their crimes, the length of the 
sentence actually served did not. 10 
III. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 
To remedy the disparity and uncertainty in federal sentencing, 
Congress created the Federal Sentencing Commission whose main 
goal was to "provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of 
sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among de-
fendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar 
criminal conduct." A few states have developed guideline sentencing 
in response to the same concerns.11 In designing a system to replace 
individualized sentencing, Congress required several factors to be 
taken into consideration in formulating the sentencing guidelines. 
These include the nature of the offense, mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances, deterrent effects of the sentence on the convicted indi-
vidual and others, and the incidence of the particular offense in the 
community and in the nation.12 
The Commission designed the guidelines to focus more on the 
crime, rather than the individual defendant.13 Empirical evidence 
had cast doubt on the rehabilitative model by suggesting that correc-
tional rehabilitation programs were ineffective in reducing criminal 
behavior. 14 In an attempt to achieve more effective sentencing, the 
primary goals of sentencing shifted to retribution and deterrence, 
making most individual offender characteristics far less important. 
To achieve honesty in sentencing, the Commission required that any 
9. See, Weigel, "The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal," 36 
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 83, 98-99 (1988). In addition, serious questions were raised as to 
disparities based upon race, gender and economic background of the offender. See, 
panel discussion, "Equality Versus Discretion in Sentencing," 26 Am. Grim. L. Rev. 
1813 (1989). 
10. See Polito, "The Rights of Crime Victims in the Criminal Justice System: Is 
Justice Blind to the Victims of Crime?," 16 New Eng. J. on Grim. & Civ. Confinement 
241 (1990). 
11. See, e.g., Andrew von Hirsch et al., The Sentencing Commission and Its 
Guidelines 18-26 (1987), which examines the experience of six states. 
12. 18 u.s.c. § 3553(b). 
13. Hunsaker, "Are Departures From the Sentencing Guidelines Undermining 
the Goals of Congress: United States v. Lara," 8 Cooley L. Rev. 119 (1991), quoting, 
1984 U.S. Code Gong. & Admin. News 3182, 3235. 
14. See, e.g., Douglas Lipton, Robert Martinson & Judith Wilks, The Effectiveness 
of Correctional Treatment: A Survey of Treatment Evaluation Studies (1975). 
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sentence imposed be served completely, less minor credit for good 
time served.15 
The guideline range takes into account the crime of conviction, 
particular characteristics of the crime and the defendant, as well as 
the offender's past convictions. Because all persons convicted of simi-
lar crimes who exhibit similar characteristics would become subject 
to the same guideline range, the sentencing guidelines are designed 
to reduce disparity and uncertainty in sentencing by confining the 
judge's discretion to the guideline range. However, because the Com-
mission recognized "the difficulty of foreseeing and capturing a single 
set of guidelines that encompasses the vast range of human conduct 
potentially relevant to a sentencing decision, "16 a departure provision 
was included in the guidelines. 
IV. DEVELOPING PROBLEMS 
Although guidelines sentencing both in the federal and state sys-
tems may reduce disparity and uncertainty in sentencing, it has ag-
gravated other problems and failed to provide solutions. A key 
concern has been that sentencing people to longer terms with no pos-
sibility of parole increases the prison population. The United States 
now imprisons a greater percentage of its population than any other 
country,l7 By 1990, over 750,000 people were in state or federal pris-
ons. When the over 400,000 citizens in local jails is included, the to-
tal incarcerated population is well in excess of one million.18 Every 
year the population of our jails and prisons increases faster than the 
increase in the general population.19 
15. 18 u.s.c. 3624(b). 
16. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual1988 at 1.7. 
17. Dailey, "Prison and Race in Minnesota," 64 U. of Colo. L. Rev. 761 (1993); 
Associated Press, "5 year old sentencing law sends more to prison longer," The Times 
Union, June 22, 1992, A6. The Bureau of Justice Statistics of the U.S. Justice Depart-
ment reviewed federal criminal prosecutions since 1986. The percentage of sentenced 
defendants going to prison increased from 52% to 74%. The average length of 
sentences served increased 29% from 1986-1990. One observer refers to the increase 
in growth in prison populations in the United States as "astonishing." Blumstein, 
"Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Populations Revisited," 64 U. of Colo. L. Rev. 
743 (1993). 
18. Louis W. Jankowski, Correctional Populations in the United States, Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, July 1992, at 8, 78. 
19. Dean J. Champion, Felony Probation: Problems and Prospects, at 77 (1988). 
Between the years 1976 and 1986, the adult resident population in the United States 
increased about 17%. During the same time period corrections populations increased 
by the following percentages: 
Adults in jail 
Adults in prison 
Adults on probation 
Adults on parole/conditional release 
85% increase 
100% increase 
121% increase 
98% increase 
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The rising financial cost of our overcrowded jails and prisons can 
be seen everywhere.20 The consensus of most experts is that the fed-
eral prisons are between 50% and 60% over design capacity,21 and 
the problem is not limited to the federal system. No state seems to be 
immune from overcrowding. Two states that initiated alternative 
sentencing programs, Oregon and Delaware, did so only when their 
jails and prisons were almost at a crisis point.22 Construction costs 
now average $70,000 a bed in the United States.23 The costs are not 
simply in construction. By virtually every estimate, jails and prisons 
are by far the costliest form ofpunishment.24 The Federal Bureau of 
Prisons estimates incarceration to be almost fifteen times more ex-
pensive than standard probation in the federal system. 25 Depending 
on the region, maintenance costs of jails and prisons range from 
$10,000-20,000 per year, per inmate.26 
The problems with the American penal system are not simply 
statistical or cost related. On a humanitarian basis, tremendous con-
cerns have been raised with the penal sanction here. Conditions in 
most United States prisons are grim. For both violent and non-vio-
lent offenders, jails and prisons foster inmate gangs and long-term 
coalitions. These coalitions often have a greater influence over in-
mates' lives, the choices they make, and their future conduct than 
prison officials and programs. Moreover, it is clear that inmate 
20. Jankowski, supra n. 18, at 10: 
1978 1983 1988 1989 
# of inmates 158,394 223,551 343,569 395,553 
rated capacity 245,094 261,556 339,633 367,769 
%of rated cap. occupied 65% 85% 101% 108% 
21. The Bureau of Prisons reported that the federal prison system was operating 
at 158% of design capacity in 1988. Federal Sentencing Reporter, July-Aug. 1988, at 
105. 
22. When the Sentencing Accountability Commission was appointed in 1984, only 
two states incarcerated more people, per capita, than Delaware. The state had 274 
inmates for every 100,000 citizens. du Pont, IV, "Expanding Sentencing Options: A 
Governor's Perspective," NIJ Reports, Jan. 1985, at 2. 
Oregon developed its sentencing guidelines facing 18 of its 33 county jails being 
under federal court orders related to population. Kathleen Bogan, Oregon's Sanction 
Units Exchange System for Felony Sentencing Guidelines, Federal Sentencing Re-
porter, July-Aug. 1991, at 36. 
23. Andrew R. Klein, Alternative Sentencing: A Practitioner's Guide iv (1988). 
24. Weinstein, Symposium, "Alternative Punishments Under the New Federal 
Sentencing Guideline," Federal Sentencing Reporter July/Aug. 1988, at 96, 98. See 
generally, Symposium, "A Decade in Sentencing Guidelines: Revisiting the Role of 
the Legislature," 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 181-507 (1993). 
25. Id. at 98. The Bureau of Prisons puts the cost to the federal system at $40.64 
per inmate, per day, for prison; $34.24 per resident, per d11-y, for a halfway house; and, 
$2.74 per day, per probationer, for probation. 
26. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Just., Sourcebook of Criminal Jus-
tice Statistics 1990, at 87 (Kathleen Maguire & Timothy J. Flanagan eds. 1991). Av-
erage cost, per inmate, of operating expenses in U.S. jails is $10,639. Average cost in 
the urban Northeast is $17,710. Maintenance costs for prisons are in excess of 
$20,000 per year, per inmate. Klein, supra n. 23, at iv. 
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safety is a daily concern, and modern prisons have evolved into a kind 
of violence ridden condition oflife.27 Sadly, the stress brought about 
by living in constant physical danger exacerbates the psychiatric 
symptoms that many inmates have before they ever enter prison. 
Finally, the failure of the United States may be seen in its inabil-
ity to stem the tide of violent criminal behavior.28 America's prisons 
and jails do not keep its streets safe. Regardless of how many people 
are locked up, Americans still feel unprotected.29 The standard ap-
proach of the criminal justice system to offenders has been either to 
lock them up and expect time to change their behavior, or do almost 
nothing with the unconfined offenders. 30 There has been little in the 
way of alternatives until recently. · 
For some, the critical failure of penal sanctions in the United 
States is that defendants become educated in "schools of crime." 
United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Section Chief 
Gerhard O.W. Mueller wrote: 
The specific direction of motives and drives is learned from 
definitions of the legal code as favorable or unfavorable. A 
person becomes delinquent because of an excess of defini-
27. See, Justice Blackmun's statement, dissenting in United States v. Bailey, 444 
u.s. 394, 420-21 (1980): 
. . . . But we do not live in an ideal world "even" (to use a self-centered 
phrase) in America, so far as jail and prison conditions are concerned. The 
complaints that this Court, and every other American appellate court, re-
ceives almost daily from prisoners about conditions of incarceration, about 
filth, about homosexual rape, and about brutality are not always the mouth-
ings of the purely malcontent. The Court itself acknowledges that the condi-
tions these respondents complained about do exist .... 
The atrocities and inhuman conditions of prison life in America are almost 
unbelievable; surely they are nothing less than shocking. The dissent in the 
Bailey case in the Court of Appeals acknowledge that "the circumstances of 
prison life are such that at least a colorable, if not credible, claim of duress or 
necessity can be raised with respect to virtually every escape." ... 
A youthful inmate can expect to be subjected to homosexual gang rape his 
first night in jail, or, it has been said, even in the van on the way to jail. 
Weaker inmates become the property of stronger prisoners or gangs, who sell 
the sexual services of the victim. Prison officials either are disinterested in 
stopping abuse of prisoners by other prisoners or are incapable of doing so, 
given the limited resources society allocates .... 
28. See, e.g., Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra n. 26. In the 1980's, the Total 
Crime Index increased every year except 1982-84. The total increase from 1979 to 
1989 was 12.2 million to 14.2 million. Violent crime showed an increase every year 
but four (1976, 1982-1983, 1987). 
29. ld. at 171. Every year, for the last ten years, a majority of Americans report 
feeling that crime has remained the same or increased from the previous year. More-
over, the repeat offender is increasingly dangerous even after incarceration. In one 
famous study sponsored by the RAND Corporation, the researchers matched proba-
tioners with prisoners and found prisoners and higher recidivism rates, both across 
crime type and in an aggregate, two-year follow up period. Joan Petersilia, et al., 
Prison versus Probation in California: Implications for Crime and Offender Recidi-
vism, at 23 (1986). 
30. Id. at 2. 
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tions favorable to violation of the law and an absence of defi-
nitions unfavorable to violation of the law.31 
709 
Prison provides many of these "definitions favorable to violation of 
the law." Inmates see their more violent peers achieve power, re-
spect, and notoriety through illegal means. In fact, prison may be the 
perfect environment to reinforce any encouragement to law-breaking 
which exists in the inmate's outside life. 
v. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PENAL SANCTION OF IMPRISONMENT 
In recent years, strong arguments have been offered in favor of 
sentencing alternatives. The arguments are grounded in a mix of 
positive features of alternative programs and negative aspects of 
prisons. The reasons run the spectrum from the humanitarian, to the 
financial, to the practical. At a bare minimum, alternatives to incar-
ceration can free financial and personnel resources which are badly 
needed elsewhere. Even if one is prepared to give up on the idea of 
reducing the incidence of criminal behavior through rehabilitation in 
favor of an approach which only seeks to incapacitate criminals, one 
cannot ignore the possibility of accomplishing this goal by using 
many less resources. By a fortunate coincidence, many less expen-
sive alternatives to incarceration appear to do a better job than jail or 
prison at reducing recidivism rates. 
A House Arrest - Home Detention 
A sentence of home detention means the defendant may not 
leave his home except for employment. 32 The means of enforcement 
varies; however, virtually all programs use some type of electronic 
monitoring. The Florida house arrest program made use of the two 
most popular methods. A telephone robot calls selected offenders at 
prescribed time intervals and records the results on a printout which 
is reviewed by a program officer. Additionally, the calls are recorded 
so the offender's voice can be verified.33 
The second method involves a tamper-proof bracelet. The brace-
let is placed on the offender's wrist. When the telephone robot calls, 
the offender must insert the bracelet into the special phone equip-
ment where it can send a signal which is unique to the offender. This 
31. Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Sentencing Process and Purpose 112 (1977). 
32. See, e.g., Chi, "House Arrest: Florida's Community Control Program", in Inno-
vations, 1 (Council of State Gov't Innovations Report RM764, July 1986). Offenders 
under Florida's program are only allowed to leave their home at prearranged times 
for employment or public service work. Specially arranged activities include doctor's 
appointments, religious services, and self-improvement programs in the community. 
However, these events must be approved in advance by the community control officer. 
Some jurisdictions even require the offender to arrange for shopping and laundry to 
be done by friends and family, when possible. ld. at 2. 
33. ld. at 2. 
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signal positively identifies the offender as being at home, without the 
use of a program officer to review printouts. The offender must still 
record his name, the date, and the time for spot-audits.34 Electronic 
monitoring may also include a passive version of the electronic brace-
let described above. This system does not require a telephone robot. 
Rather, the bracelet emits a signal which must be picked up by a 
receiver in the offender's home. If contact is ever broken, the receiver 
sends an alert, over the phone lines, to the local police or the house 
arrest program. 35 
Since its introduction in 1983, use of electronic monitoring has 
grown rapidly, with a number of states passing legislation authoriz-
ing electronic monitoring as a condition of probation or alternative 
sentence. 36 Most often, the targeted offenders are those who would 
ordinarily go to prison. 37 The trend is to use house arrest - with 
electronic monitoring - as a true alternative to incarceration. 38 
. One great advantage to home detention is financial, as it allows 
for the diversion of the offender from high-cost incarceration. How-
ever, the advantage runs deeper. Offenders under house arrest are 
not just permitted, but often required, to maintain employment.39 
When the offender is unable to secure employment, he is usually as-
signed public service work and can become a productive citizen. 40 
Another advantage of home detention is its inherent flexibility. Ju-
risdictions place different restrictions on the times which offenders 
are confined to their homes.41 More importantly, the structure of any 
electronic monitoring program permits the use of a multi-level sys-
tem linked to the seriousness of the crime. The most serious crimes 
eligible for house arrest may require constant confinement, with rigid 
restrictions on exceptions; lesser crimes are accompanied by greater 
amounts of freedom. 
In terms of ultimate societal goals, the program may prove 
highly beneficial. In handing down a sentence of house arrest, one 
court noted that a term of incarceration would likely have a destruc-
tive effect, and a large fine would create a substantial impediment to 
34. Id. at 2-3. 
35. ld. at 6. States such as New Jersey, Oregon, and Kentucky use some version 
of this passive system. 
36. Klein, supra n. 23, at 239. 
37. Chi, supra n. 32, at 2. 
38. Klein, supra, n. 23, at 239. 
39. Chi, supra n. 32, at 2. 
40. Id. at 2. 
41. See, e.g., Chi, supra n. 32, at 2-5. The Florida program requires constant con-
finement, except for employment. Kentucky requires offenders to stay in their homes 
between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. 
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rehabilitation. The court concluded that home detention was more 
likely to induce reform than either incarceration or a fine. 42 
The attractiveness of home detention lies in its ability to achieve 
the goals of incapacitation without the problems associated with in-
carceration. A sentence which leaves room for a job or community 
service, increases the role of restitution in the sentencing frame-
work. 43 Society is protected when the offender is homebound during 
the high crime hours of the evening. The offender is punished by 
both the restitution/fees and the incapacitation. Yet, costs are a frac-
tion ofincarceration.44 Additionally, the offender is not exposed to an 
environment which teaches and encourages crime. 
42. United States v. Murphy, 108 F.R.D. 437 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). The defendant 
there was subject to $56,000 in fines and 50 years in prison. The court explained its 
decision. 
All agree that longer prison terms, and imprisonment for more and more 
persons cannot be borne indefinitely. Other controls to prevent crime, social 
policies to avoid criminality and alternative punishments are essential. 
The goals of punishment are incapacitation, rehabilitation, specific de-
terrence of the individual defendant, general deterrence of those who might 
commit crimes without the threat of punishment and, finally, the related 
goals of providing an outlet for the expression of strong disapproval of unac-
ceptable conduct together with the catharsis of a specific statement of public 
condemnation together with punishment. 
Incapacitation of those who are dangerous must, of course, continue to be 
our policy. · 
Rehabilitation in general takes place more effectively outside prison 
walls. Federal probation officers in this District have the resources and skill 
to exercise strict control, supply training and help with jobs. Cutting the 
person off from family, friends and jobs during this process is 
counterproductive. . .. 
Obviously the maximum fine could never be paid and would accomplish 
nothing except to make it impossible for the defendant to live and rehabili-
tate herself. The maximum terms of imprisonment provided by the statutes 
are much too long to even be considered seriously for this relatively young 
person who has never, so far as we know, committed another crime. 
Putting her in prison for any substantial length of time will undoubtedly 
help to destroy her. The conditions of imprisonment, even in the best prisons 
for women, are reprehensible. 
She is sentenced to 2 years of home detention on Count One in place of 
imprisonment .... 
The defendant will be required to remain in her apartment, or other 
place of abode. She may not change her residence without the consent of 
Probation. She may leave only as permitted by Probation for medical rea-
sons, employment and religious services and essential shopping for food and 
the like. She may go directly to and from her job and may seek a new job only 
as permitted by Probation. She is at all times subject to strict supervision, to 
surprise visits by Probation and strict control. 
Id. at 438-39. 
43. Klein, supra n. 23, at 237. 
44. Chi, supra n. 32, at 4. Florida's Community Control pilot project cost $2.86 
per inmate, per day, while the prison system costs $27.54 per inmate, per day. The 
estimated $20 million saved in fiscal year 1985-86, from 2,100 fewer prison commit-
ments, was calculated without consideration of the 80% of offenders in the program 
who "found gainful employment and paid taxes, supervision fees, restitution, and 
have supported themselves as well as their dependents." 
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B. Community Confinement 
Closely related to home detention is community confinement, 
which has developed in response to concerns over home detention. 
Two recurring objections to the use of home detention have been of-
fered. First, many offenders cannot afford the cost of the phone line 
which must be installed. 45 Second, the sentence may act to confine 
an offender to an environment which is just as destructive as 
prison.46 Community confinement has all of the positive aspects of 
house arrest, and it addresses these two concerns. 
A sentence of community confinement is essentially a term of 
house arrest, except it is served in a halfway house or in-patient 
treatment facility.47 In both situations, the offender is confined only 
by the monitoring system and the threat of jail if she violates the 
terms of the sentence. Both sentences permit the offender to work 
and pay for the cost of the sentence. Community confinement, how-
ever, has the flexibility of keeping the monitoring equipment in place, 
even if the offender is at first unable to pay. 
Another difference between the two systems is that community 
confinement is often a more productive environment for the offender. 
Small, community based settings provide a platform for reintegra-
tion.4s The offender is removed from a harmful environment and in-
capacitated - through electronic monitoring -'- while assisted in 
building a new, productive support system. 
C. Restitution 
Restitution of victim losses is increasing as jurisdictions seek to 
involve victims more in the criminal justice process. To some, restitu-
tion contains the best features of punishment and clinical treatment. 
Restitution is unlike any other criminal sanction because it requires 
the offender to do something, as opposed to something being done to 
him.49 Use of restitution results in a concentration on the victim-
offender relationship, instead of the government-offender relation-
ship. Since victim and offender are the two most intimate parties 
involved, this focus increases social harmony and the sense of com-
45. Chi, supra n. 32, at 3-4. 
46. Id. at 1. 
47. ld. at 1. 
48. See, e.g., Belinda Rogers McCarthy & Bernard J. McCarthy, Community 
Based Corrections (1984). Reintegration is an idea born in the experience of post 
World War II veterans affairs. Officials discovered many veterans had difficulty ad-
justing to life back home. Time spent in veteran's hospitals made them more depen-
dent op. institutional help. Community based. programs oriented toward training the 
veteran to live on his own proved to be most successful. 
49. See, e.g., Stephen Schafer, Compensation and Restitution of Crime Victims (2d 
ed. 1970). 
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munity. It personalizes both the effects of crime and the need for 
compensation. 5o 
One technique which increases the success rate of restitution is 
victim-offender meetings. Forcing the victim and offender to sit 
down, face to face, in a controlled environment is another result in 
the growing trend of victim involvement in the process.51 These 
meetings give the victim the opportunity to express how the crime 
affected her. The Department of Justice studied the records of 17,000 
juvenile offenders, from 1977-1979. They found that those who par-
ticipated in victim-offender meetings had consistently higher rates of 
restitution payments and lower recidivism rates.52 
D. Community Service 
Community service programs are appropriate wherever restitu-
tion would normally be used, but there is no specific victim to be re-
imbursed. Crimes injure society at large, regardless of whether a 
specific individual is injured. Embezzlement, for example, does not 
solely injure the party defrauded, but also injures the public trust. In 
addition to reimbursing the stolen funds, the offender owes a debt 
which must be repaid to the community. 
Like restitution, community service personalizes the effects of 
crime by requiring action on the part of the offender.53 Another ad-
vantage to community service is the financial savings. In New York, 
the Gennessee County Sheriff created a community service program 
in order to avoid the cost of constructing a new jail. In one year, the 
program supervised 15,000 hours of work. This service saved 2,500 
hours of jail time, or $75,000 of incarceration costs. 54 
E. Standard Probation 
Probation is the basic root of alternative sentencing. 55 One char-
acteristic element of probation is the power of the judge to tailor con-
ditions of probation to the offender.56 Most jurisdictions apply a 
reasonableness test to the conditions. 
50. Klein, supra n. 23, at 141-42. 
51. Id. at 159. 
52. ld. at 160. These results held true even when the study was controlled for 
variables such as seriousness of the offense, past crimes of the offenders, and, amount 
of restitution. 
53. Id. at 73, and accompanying text. 
54. Id. at 178. The savings were even greater, as the numbers do not include the 
funds which would have been spent to pay someone to do the work that the offender 
performed. 
55. Id. at 2. 
56. In North Carolina, in 1984, a 40-year-old doctor dr6ve drunk and killed the 
family breadwinner. The judge sentenced him to 5 years probation. In addition, he 
was ordered to pay the deceased's family $25,000 per year, for 30 years- totalling 
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A condition of probation is invalid for not serving the stated 
goals of probation if it: 
1) Has no relation to the crime of which the offender was 
convicted, 
2) Relates to conduct which is not, in itself, criminal, 
and 
3) Requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably 
related to criminality, does not serve the statutory ends 
of probation and is invalid. 5 7 
As the probation alternative became more popular the system over-
loaded. From about 1975 to 1985, California saw a 15% increase in 
the number of citizens on probation, but a 10% decrease in funding 
for probation departments. 5 8 Even worse, the same period saw a 29% 
decrease in personnel in California's probation departments. 59 De-
spite its flexibility, probation developed a bad reputation in this coun-
try. The average American is aware that probation caseloads are 
quite large so that supervision may amount to little more than one 
contact per month. 60 
Increased availability of intermediate sanctions may be the key 
to breaking this impasse. Currently in most places we see only two 
fundamentally different choices available in dealing with criminals: 
incarceration or probation. Considering the public's distaste for the 
virtual unlimited freedom of routine probation described above, it 
should be no surprise that incarceration is the prevailing choice. 
More and more criminal justice experts are calling for a middle 
ground for offenders who are neither low-risk nor serious threats. 61 
F. Intensive Probation Supervision (IPS) 
Inspired by standard probation, intensive probation supervision 
(IPS) goes well beyond the traditional programs. IPS probationers 
are required to work, instead of merely encouraged to do so. More 
importantly, there is greater supervision by the probation officer, and 
even technical violations of IPS rules result in jail time. Since the 
increased supervision is considered vital to the success of IPS, some 
programs have probation officers to probationer ratios written into 
the enabling legislation. 62 
$750,000 - and to donate a pint of blood every two months for the entire term of his 
probation. Klein, supra n. 23, at 129-131. 
57. Id. at 74. 
58. Champion, supra n. 19, at 22. 
59. Id. at 83. 
60. Id. 
61. See, Petersilia, "Evaluating Alternative Sanctions: The Case of Intensive Su-
pervision," Federal Sentencing Reporter, July-Aug. 1991, at 30. 
62. One of the first IPS programs began in Illinois in 1984. In addition to employ-
ment, drug testing, curfew, and arrest checks, the Illinois program requires a mini-
mum of five face-to-face meetings between officer and probationer per week. 
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As with all the alternative sanctions discussed, IPS may offer 
substantial financial savings. 63 Examples of savings with IPS range 
from 75% of the cost of incarceration (at the worst) to 15% of the cost 
of incarceration (at the best).64 The true savings lie in the population 
from which IPS probationers are drawn. When the program limits 
consideration to those who are ineligible for standard probation and 
who are headed for prison, the savings mount. 
If IPS programs are to continue successfully, they must meet sev-
eral challenges. First, IPS must not suffer the same fate as standard 
probation, system overload. Criminal justice executives and adminis-
trators must observe the design limits of the programs. The central 
key to IPS is intense supervision. Increased caseloads due to fiscal 
cutbacks would defeat this central objective. Another problem en-
countered by some IPS projects is being too far ahead of available 
treatment resources. 5 5 Although more punitive than standard proba-
tion, IPSs still seek to provide for the proper clinical treatment needs 
of the offender. It is, of course, self defeating if programs are unable 
to get offenders into drug, alcohol, and other necessary treatment 
projects, even when mandated as a condition of IPS. 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
As the crime rate in the United States rose, frustration with the 
criminal justice system also rose. In response, dramatic changes 
were made in sentencing and incarceration patterns for both the 
state and federal systems. Americans have seen a move toward more 
fixed sentencing and far higher incarceration rates. Serious crime 
has not, however, generally declined. As a result, for the first time in 
many years, jurisdictions throughout the United States are consider-
ing alternative penal sanctions. Some of the more important alterna-
tives have been reviewed here.6 6 This trend toward innovation -
and cost saving - is likely to accelerate in the future as we look to 
more effective and efficient means of combatting crime, while at the 
same time rehabilitating offenders. 
Champion, supra n. 19, at 22-23. This intense monitoring was made possible by limit-
ing caseloads to no more than 25 probationers per officer. 
63. The initial program in Illinois was set up to monitor 750 offenders, at a cost of 
$1.6 million, a considerable savings from the $10 million it cost Illinois to incarcerate 
750 offenders. ld. at 23. 
64. Petersilia, supra n. 61, at 32. 
65. Petersilia, supra n. 61, at 31. 
66. But not the only alternatives. Others include mandatory drug treatment pro-
grams; required counseling or education in lieu of prison; prison boot camp; victim-
offender reconciliation programs; abolition of incarceration for all first time offenders 
(except violent offenders); and innovative sentencing by individual judges to make 
"the punishment fit the crime" or to "teach criminals a lesson." 
